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Abstract This paper assesses whether and how common characteristics of jury
members or peer voters affect the outcomes of voting systems. In particular, we analyze
to what extent these common features result in voting bias. We take as a case study the
Eurovision Song Contest for which an extensive amount of historical data is available.
In contrast to earlier studies we analyze the impact of common factors on the bias
individually for each country, which is necessary to substantiate the publicly debated
accusations of regional block voting by certain groups of countries. We establish
strong evidence for voting bias in the song contest on the basis of geography, even
after correction for culture, language, religion and ethnicity. However, these effects
do generally not correspond to the usual accusations. We believe that our findings
extend to all instances where groups of jury members or peer voters share certain
common factors, which may cause voting bias. It is important to identify such structures
explicitly, as it can help avoiding bias in the first place.
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1 Introduction
In various areas of life people judge the performance of other people through a system
of jury or peer voting. Methods to detect judgement bias, and the structure of that bias,
are therefore relevant in many different environments. Examples include organiza-
tions where complex decisions have to be taken based on aggregated expert opinions,
sportive or cultural events where the level of quality is judged by people with different
backgrounds, and peer review processes for scientific journals. Since it is relatively
hard to measure bias effects in organizations, most research focuses on the latter two
examples to investigate these issues, in the hope that the results extend to other cases
where data is harder to obtain.
The existing literature dealing with voting and judgement behavior generally views
the jury or peer voters as a single entity and ignores the possibility that there are
subgroups with their own particular voting behavior. Consequently, existing studies
assess the determinants of the voting bias on the aggregate level of the jury as a whole.
That is, they study the average impact of an explanatory variable on the votes, where
the average is taken over all jury members. This method may fail to capture all voting
patterns when certain effects offset each other at the aggregate level.
The goal of this paper is to provide a framework for assessing whether and how
common characteristics of voting groups affect the outcomes of voting systems and
to what extent these common features result in voting bias. We take as a case study
the Eurovision Song Contest for which an extensive amount of historical data is avai-
lable. For this contest the assumption that all jury members behave homogeneously is
particularly disputable, since the peer voters in this competition are the inhabitants of
different countries. Given the substantial cultural, linguistic, religious, and macroeco-
nomic differences between the various countries participating in the contest, it seems
unrealistic to assume they all show similar voting behavior. Moreover, since the jury
members in this contest are individual countries, we can construct various voting
groups based on, e.g. similarities in culture, language and religion. In this way, the
song contest offers a unique opportunity to investigate subjective biases in peer voting
systems. That there is some systematic bias in Eurovision Contest voting can hardly
be doubted when considering, e.g. Cyprus and Greece, who awarded each other with
the maximal number of points in virtually all years during the period 1993–2003.
If we assume homogenous voting behavior across countries such as, e.g. Haan et al.
(2005) and Ginsburgh and Noury (2006), we could ignore certain subtle voting patterns
when some effects offset each other on the aggregate level. Moreover, under this
assumption it is impossible to investigate the often heard suspicions and accusations
that politics and international relations dictate a lot of the voting and that, e.g. some
Eastern-European countries are guilty of regional block voting. Therefore, this paper
starts with analyzing the voting behavior separately for each country and subsequently
assesses common patterns in the votes.
We establish the following results. There is strong evidence for voting bias in the
Eurovision Song Contest, but there are substantial differences in the way geographical,
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cultural, linguistic, religious, and ethnical factors influence the voting bias of individual
countries. The bias of some countries mainly consists of unexplainable noise, while
the votes of other participants are strongly influenced by the various factors. However,
there is hardly any empirical evidence to support the usual accusations of regional
block voting by certain groups of countries.
We think that our findings transcend the slightly frivolous nature of our data. In all
instances where groups of jury members or peer voters share certain common factors, a
voting bias related to these factors may arise. It is important to identify such structures
explicitly, as it may can avoiding bias in the first place.
The setup of this paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses some earlier studies
dealing with the Eurovision Song Contest. Section 3 explains the rules of the contest
and the data set used in this paper. In Sect. 4 we describe the variables that potentially
affect the voting bias. Also, we provide some sample statistics as preliminary evidence
that these variables do indeed play a role. This leads us to Sect. 5, where we describe
the panel data model that explains the voting bias from several determinants. Next,
Sect. 6 discuss the estimation results and investigates the robustness of the estimation
results. Section 7 investigates the accusations and suspicions of regional block voting
by assessing common patterns in the voting biases of the participating countries.
Finally, Sect. 8 concludes.
2 Literature review
There is ample evidence that people are not only guided by the quality of the perfor-
mance they have to judge, but by many other factors as well. For instance, the gender
of the performer and its order of appearance in a competition may affect jury voting;
see, e.g. Flôres and Ginsburgh (1996) who establish such serial position effects for the
Queen Elisabeth music competition. Haan et al. (2005) and Bruine de Bruin (2005)
find similar biases in the votes for the Eurovision Song Contest. Ginsburgh and Noury
(2006), who analyze the voting behavior in the same contest, show that voters tend
to favor songs coming from a related culture and sung in a similar language as their
own. In the field of sports, Zitzewitz (2006) establishes nationalistic biases in Olympic
winter sports judging and Bruine de Bruin (2005) finds serial position effects in World
and European Figure Skating Championships.
Zitzewitz (2006) shows that for the particular example of Olympic winter sports,
there is indeed bias in the judgement for some of the sports involved. The amount
of bias differs quite markedly over the different sports. He shows for example that in
figure skating the bias seems to be rather structured (he mentions ‘vote trading’ and
‘block judging’), thus reinforcing the conclusions reported by Campbell and Galbraith
(1996) who show that in this sport the bias seems to be particularly consistent over
time. By contrasting the results for the different winter sports, Zitzewitz (2006) makes
some recommendations to reduce the effect of bias. He argues that these recommen-
dations should also be valuable in the more general setting of decision making in large
organizations.1
1 See Popovic (2000) and the references therein for another example of a biased peer voting system in
sports that has been investigated extensively.
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Another well-documented proxy for structured bias in organizations can be found in
the peer reviewing of scientific publications. In a study by Link (1998), who considers
all submissions to a medical journal in 1995 and 1996, a striking pattern for the bias
emerges. Reviewers from both inside and outside the United States evaluate papers
written by authors outside the US similarly, but papers submitted by US authors signi-
ficantly more favorably. This effect was present for both US and non-US reviewers,
although the effect was stronger in the first group. In a similar recent study by Ross
et al. (2006) evidence is found of reviewer bias in the open review of abstracts for
a medical conference. Authors prefer abstracts from the US, from English-speaking
countries outside the US, and from prestigious academic institutions. Also, an expe-
riment with blinded review suggests that this can reduce the bias, suggesting that
adopting blinded peer reviews for these scientific meetings might be beneficial for a
fair reviewing process.
There is an extensive amount of research available on the possible voting bias in the
Eurovision Song Contest. Fenn et al. (2006) study the voting patterns in the Eurovision
Song Contest during the years 1992–2003 by means of a network approach. They
establish what the authors call ‘voting cliques’. Additionally, they use cluster analysis
to show which countries behave similarly in terms of the average number of points
awarded to other countries. The results suggest some relation between countries’ voting
patterns based on geographical proximity. The authors conclude that the observed
voting similarities are caused by a common historical or cultural background instead
of just geographical proximity, but do not investigate this any further. See also Yair
(1995), Yair and Maman (1996), Doosje and Haslam (2005) and Gatherer (2004,
2006).
Ginsburgh and Noury (2006) provide the most detailed statistical analysis perfor-
med so far upon the Eurovision Song contest votes. The authors distinguish ‘vote
trading’ (where two countries exchange votes) and ‘cultural voting’ (where countries
prefer songs from those countries which satisfy certain cultural characteristics). For
the period 1975–2003, Ginsburgh and Noury (2006) test the hypothesis that votes
have been exchanged in the contest. The authors find hardly any evidence for this
hypothesis. By contrast, song quality plays a substantial role in explaining the voting
behavior. Moreover, variables such as language and cultural characteristics turn out
significant in most of their models. On average, countries prefer songs in the same
language and coming from a related culture.
3 Definitions and data
This section discusses the rules for the Eurovision Song Contest and the data to be
used in our analysis.2
2 To save space, we do not report full details about the data collection and preparation. An appendix with
extensive information about the data is available from the authors upon request.
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3.1 Rules of the contest
The rules for the Eurovision Song Contest are relatively simple. Each participating
country contributes a song that has not been released commercially before with a
duration less than three minutes. If the song is performed by a group, there can be at
most six people in it. Performers can sing in any language nowadays, even in a non-
existent language.3 However, from 1966 until 1972 and again from 1978 until 1998
songs were required to be performed in one of a country’s official national languages.
Each country ranks all the entries and assigns twelve points to its favorite entry, ten
points to its second favorite entry, and eight through one points to its third through tenth
favorites. Obviously, countries are not allowed to vote for themselves. The number of
participants has always been larger than 20 in recent years, so each jury assigns zero
points to many countries under this system. Voting takes place after all songs have
been performed, and the country with the highest number of points wins. Since 1997
(partially) and 1998 (fully) points are awarded by televoting4 instead of professional
juries in virtually all countries.
3.2 Selection of years
The scoring system by which each song can earn 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 or 12 points was
introduced in 1975. Since 2004 a semi-final has been organized every year before the
main competition, which partially determines which countries are going to participate
during the main event. This semi-final was introduced to allow a larger number of
countries to participate in the contest. We only use the years 1975–2003 (inclusive)
in our analysis, a period during which the voting rules have hardly changed. The only
major change in this period is the introduction of televoting in 1997/1998, when voting
by telephone replaced the professional juries.
3.3 Selection of countries
We consider all countries that have participated at least three times in the period 1975–
2003. These can be found in the first column of Table 1, together with the number
of years in which each country participated (‘# years’) and the total number of votes
assigned per country (‘# votes’). The total number of votes given by all countries during
the years considered amounts to 13, 014. Note that, after the breakup of Yugoslavia,
the countries Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Macedonia are treated as separate
nations.
4 Explaining the voting bias
Since the winner of the Eurovision Song Contest is determined by a scoring sys-
tem based on votes given by the participating countries themselves, suspicions and
3 Belgium chose to do so in 2003.
4 Televoting refers to the system that allows the public to vote by phone or text message.
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accusations of political and regional block voting are as old as the song contest
itself.
To make clear that voting bias is a relative phenomenon, we turn back to the example
of Greece and Cyprus who awarded each other the maximal number of points during
virtually all years in the period 1993–2003. In 1992 Greece became 5th out of 23 with
only eight countries giving zero points, while in 2003 it became 17th out of 26, with
19 countries giving zero points. It seems natural to consider the 12 points awarded
to Greece by Cyprus in 2003 as a stronger indication for a bias than the 12 points
awarded in 1992. This section start with the definition of voting bias and subsequently
addresses the geographical, cultural, linguistic, and religious factors that potentially
affect the bias in the voting behavior. Moreover, we provide some sample statistics as
preliminary evidence that these factors are indeed expected to influence the votes.5
4.1 Bias
We start by defining the concept of bias. Let Ti j be the number of years in which
both countries i and j participate. Let nti j be the number of countries participating in
year t , exclusive of countries i and j themselves, and sti j the points of jury i awarded
to song j in year t . If country i or j does not participate in year t , the value of sti j
equals zero. The bias bti j is defined as the difference between the points of jury i to
song j (sti j ) and the average number of points assigned by the other juries to song j
(qt j,−i ). The average bias of jury i toward song j (denoted by bi j ) is calculated as the
time-average of the bias over those years in which both countries participate. More
precisely,




stk j , (4.1)
bti j = sti j − qt j,−i , (4.2)
bi j = 1Ti j
∑
t
bti j . (4.3)
When we interpret qti j —the average number of points assigned by the other juries
to song j in year t—as a proxy for song quality, a large bias refers to an overvaluation
and a small bias to an undervaluation of a song. Hence, when the number of points
jury i assigns to song j is high, this does not necessarily mean that the bias of the jury
is also high. This will depend on the quality of the song; i.e. on the average number
of points assigned to the song by the other juries.
4.2 Geographical influences
In contrast to earlier studies, we explicitly consider variables related to the geographi-
cal position of a country. We include such variables to account for the often voiced
5 Throughout, we take the voting information from various Eurovision Song Contest web sites, see http://
www.eurovisioncontest.co.uk and http://members.fortunecity.com/mcdeil69/1980.htm.
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suspicion that these affect the votes. Most of the claims in this direction suggest that
either countries which are close to each other tend to award each other a dispropor-
tionately high number of points, or that a block of ‘West-European’ countries and a
block of ‘East-European’ countries tend to favor countries within their own block.
To investigate these hypotheses, we define several geographical variables. We take
the longitude and latitude of the participating countries’ capitals and define, for any
receiving country j to the west of the awarding country i , the variable ‘xwesti j ’ as the
distance between country i’s longitude and country j’s longitude (for countries to
the east of i it is zero).6 For any receiving country j to the east of awarding country
i , we define ‘xeasti j ’ similarly, i.e. as the distance between country i’s longitude and
country j’s longitude (for countries to the west of country i it is zero). We do the
same for the latitudes, resulting in the variables ‘ysouthi j ’ and ‘ynorthi j ’. These definitions
will allow us to detect a tendency to award more points to countries that are close,
but also a tendency to vote for countries that are more in the East or in the West.
Obviously, for some countries these variables become redundant. For example, from
Iceland’s point of view, all other countries are located to the east. If this is the case
for a particular country, we only consider a distance variable that does not distinguish
between directions.7 We also define a dummy variable ‘neighbi j ’ to indicate whether
two countries share a border on land. This variable is redundant in some cases, for
instance for islands and for countries with neigbors which do not participate in the
contest when they do.8
Table 1 displays a list of participating countries (see the column with caption ‘coun-
try’). The columns with the caption ‘min bias to’ and ‘max bias to’ contain the names
of the song countries to which the jury countries in the first column are most nega-
tively and most positively biased, respectively. This column is based on the average
bias over the period 1975–2003 as defined in expression (4.3). Similarly, the columns
with the caption ‘min bias from’ and ‘max bias from’ display the names of the juries
that are most negatively and most positively biased toward the countries in the first
column. Table 1 highlights an important role for neighboring countries. Hence, some
first confirmation of the claim that geographical position matters is found. The Nether-
lands favor Belgium, Norway favors Sweden, Germany favors Poland, Estonia favors
Latvia, Lithuania favors Latvia, and Slovenia favors Croatia. Similar effects appear
for countries that are not neighbors, but located relatively close to each other. For ins-
tance, Finland favors Estonia and Bosnia favors Slovenia. By contrast, France dislikes
Monaco’s contributions and Hungary dislikes Croatia’s performances. Even stronger
evidence for the relevance of geography is given by the pairs of countries (either neigh-
bors or located relatively close to each other) that show a mutual preference for each
other, such as Lithuania and Latvia, Estonia and Finland, Romania and Macedonia,
and Croatia and Macedonia.9
6 We have obtained the geographical distances from http://www.wcrl.ars.usda.gov/cec/java/capitals.htm.
7 We do this for Iceland, Israel, and Russia.
8 This is the case for Cyprus, Malta, Iceland, Israel, and Yugoslavia.
9 A complete overview of the average biases of individual jury countries to song countries is available from
the authors upon request.
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4.3 Religion
The role of religion in the Eurovision Song Contest was publicly discussed after
the 2005 contest won by Greece. The runner up Malta then claimed that there was a
strong bias toward Greece from other Orthodox countries.10 Although many European
countries are highly secularized, religion may still be a factor of importance. It may
reflect certain cultural characteristics of a country that have been established over
the centuries and do not necessarily disappear when the role of religion becomes less
prominent. Moreover, recent studies in the field of behavioral economics point out that
religion often affects the decisions of economic agents (see, e.g. Iannacconea 1995,
1998; Kuran 1994), providing additional motivation to assess the impact of religion
on the voting behavior. Because of cultural preferences we expect countries to favor
songs coming from countries with the same religion.
We define dummy variables ‘reli j ’, which are one if and only if the voting country i
and the performing country j share a major religion.11 A religion in a country is taken
into account if the percentage of people adhering to this religion is either the largest
among all religions, or if it is second largest with at least 20% adherence. We make
this particular choice to allow for more than one major religion in a country, but only if
it is substantial. Moreover, we take a 20% threshold level, since most countries under
consideration have about five major religions. We distinguish the religions Roman
Catholic, Orthodox, Jewish, Muslim, and Protestant (covering Lutheran, Calvinist,
Reformed, Anglican, and all other non-Catholic and non-Orthodox Christian varie-
ties). We do not use the percentages for the different religious groups as explanatory
variables, since it is difficult to obtain complete and reliable figures over the years.
4.4 Ethnicity
Since reliable migration figures are generally hard to find, we only look at the speci-
fic case of Turkey, for which such data are widely available. The first generation of
Turks came to Europe as migrant workers in the sixties. The 2004s final Report of the
Independent Commission on Turkey gives an overview of countries with a substan-
tial Turkish population. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands,
Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom all have a substantial Turkish population,
see Turkey in Europe: More than a promise? (2004). We do not use scaled versions
of population numbers as explanatory variables, since even for Turkey it is difficult
to obtain reliable figures for these numbers over the years. Instead, we use a dummy
variable ‘turkpopi ’ for each country. This dummy equals one if a country has a large
Turkish population and is zero otherwise. Generally, we expect the Turkish voters in
Europe to vote for their home country.
Some simple sample statistics provide preliminary evidence for patriotic voting.
Since televoting took over from the professional juries in 1997/1998, some of the
10 See http://www.eurosong.nl/NieuwsDetailUK.aspx?ID=246&Artiest=102&Landcode=MA.
11 We use the information provided in the CIA Factbook to determine the major religions for each country
under consideration, see http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2122.html.
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aforementioned countries (most notably France, Germany, and the Netherlands) have
started to assign many points to the Turkish contribution. For the three countries
mentioned the average bias until 1998 equals 0.0, 0.8, and 0.2 points, respectively.
After 1998 these average biases increase sharply to 4.6, 6.4, and 3.1 points.
4.5 Linguistic, cultural and performance variables
We follow the idea of Ginsburgh and Noury (2006) and use the distances between the
awarding and receiving countries’ languages as an explanatory variable in our analysis.
Hence, we use the results of the study of Dyen et al. (1992) on lexicostatistical distances
to measure these distances on a scale from zero (closest) to one (most distant). We use
the notation ‘lang_distti j ’ to indicate the lexicostatistical distance between the jury of
country i and the song of country j in year t .
The dummy variables that we use for the features defining the characteristics of the
songs speak for themselves. They characterize the song as being sung in English or
French (dummies ‘englisht j ’ and ‘frencht j ’), performed by a solo male (the dummy
‘malet j ’ equals one in this case), a male–female duet (dummy ‘duett j ’), or a group
(dummy ‘groupt j ’). Other variables identify in what order the songs are presented
during the contest (‘ordert j ’) and whether or not the performers represent the host
country in a particular year (dummy ‘hostt j ’). These factors are considered, as there
is some evidence that the order in which performances are viewed influences the
points awarded by the jury, see Flôres and Ginsburgh (1996) and Haan et al. (2005).
The gender of the performer may have some influence as well, as shown for another
competition in Ginsburgh and Van Ours (2003).
We use Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions to capture the cultural differences
among the participating countries.12 As in Ginsburgh and Noury (2006), we use the
distances between the voting and the receiving countries’ value for a Hofstede dimen-
sion as the explanatory variables. The four Hofstede dimensions are power distance,
individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance, which are denoted by ‘pdii j ’,
‘idvi j ’, ‘masi j ’, and ‘uaii j ’, respectively. Because of cultural preferences we expect
people to prefer songs coming from a similar culture and sung in a related language.
Since several studies have already analyzed the influence of variables such as lan-
guage and performance characteristics on the voting behavior during the Eurovision
Song Contest, we only briefly mention the relevance of these variables for the current
sample. Although less than 24% of all songs is in English, they account for almost
50% of all victories. Similarly, songs performed by groups have obtained more victo-
ries (41%) than expected on the basis of group participation (25%). Also the order of
performance seems to affect the votes. Although this order is drawn randomly each
year, some places perform better or worse than expected. The last performer has the
biggest advantage. This phenomenon has also been observed in other competitions,
see, e.g. Flôres and Ginsburgh (1996). Finally, the host country also seems to benefit
12 The Geert Hofstede indices for cultural differences have been taken from http://www.geert-hofstede.
com. See also Hofstede (1980, 1996).
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from its position, given that the percentage of contests won by the host country (more
than 10%) is substantially larger than expected (less than 5%).
5 The model
In this section we present a panel data model to explain the voting bias of the partici-
pating countries from various determinants.
5.1 Introduction
The votes for the Eurovision Song Contest during the period 1975–2003 constitute
a panel data set in the three dimensions time, juries, and songs. Since not all coun-
tries participate each year, the sample is unbalanced. Given the considerable size and
dimension of the data set (29 years and 36 potentially participating countries leading
to 13,014 votes) and the large number of explanatory variables, we need a model that
is both realistic and feasible.
Our approach takes into account fixed effects. In contrast to most existing fixed
effects models, we allow both intercepts and slopes to vary per jury country (see, e.g.
Yaffee 2003). We opt for such a specification, since we expect variation in the way the
voting behavior of different countries is determined by variables such as cultural and
linguistic differences, performance features, and geographical factors.
Throughout, we take the bias defined by Eqs. (4.2) and (4.1) as the dependent
variable. This has the advantage of working with a continuous variable rather than a
categorical one, such as the number of points assigned from one country to another or
the final ranking of a song in the contest.13
5.2 Country-specific model
Since our main focus is on the voting behavior of the participating countries, we
initially ignore any period effects and confine the analysis for the moment to cross-
country effects. Our panel data set consists of the dependent variable bti j —the bias
of jury i toward song j in year t—and a corresponding (1 × K ) vector of covariates
Xti j , for t = 1, . . . , T , i = 1, . . . , N , j = 1, . . . , N with some missing observations.
Here T denotes the number of years, N the number of countries under consideration,
and K the number of explanatory variables. For the full sample T = 29 and N = 36,
while K varies over different model specifications.
We write the initial model as
bti j = αi + Xti jβi + εti j , E(εti j | Xti j ) = 0, (5.4)
13 Also, since the bias represents the difference between a country’s points and the quality of the song
determined by the other countries, we do not need to explain the bias from song quality anymore. This
approach has the advantage that it avoids the problems of circularity and endogeneity encountered by
Ginsburgh and Noury (2006).
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where βi is a column vector of dimension K and αi an intercept. Identification of
the model in Eq. (5.4) requires certain restrictions on the disturbance terms. We will
discuss them later when we explain the estimation method. We stack bti j , Xti j and
εti j in such a way that we arrive at the more compact specification
bi = αi + Xiβi + εi . (5.5)
This notation emphasizes that we consider N cross-sectional equations.
5.3 Model estimation
As long as all intercepts and slopes vary across jury countries, we estimate the model
in Eq. (5.5) separately per country by means of ordinary least squares using all votes
assigned to the other countries over the years. However, as soon as we impose any cross-
country restrictions upon the coefficients, joint estimation of all country equations is
required.14
6 Estimation results
In this section we present the estimation results for several model specifications that
relate the voting bias of the Eurovision countries to several factors, such as geogra-
phical location, religion, ethnicity, culture, and religion.
First, we estimate a model with country-specific coefficients, allowing all explana-
tory variables to affect the voting bias of each country in a different way. We refer to
this specification as the ‘country-specific’ model. In the second model each variable
has equal coefficients across countries (i.e. βi = β, all i), but possibly different inter-
cepts. We refer to this as the ‘equal slopes model’. The key assumption underlying
the latter model is that the explanatory variables affect the voting behavior of all par-
ticipating countries in exactly the same way. The coefficients of the covariates thus
reflect the average impact of the factor on the countries’ voting behavior.
6.1 Geographical factors
The sample statistics in Sect. 4.2 suggest that the voting behavior of participating
countries contains a strong geographical factor. To test this in a more formal way, we
estimate, for each country, the model of Eq. (5.5). The full list of explanatory variables
contained in the vector Xti j is provided in Table 2.
14 Throughout, we use White (1980)’s robust covariance matrix to correct for (cross-sectional) heteroske-
dasticity. When the disturbance terms would additionally feature cross-sectional correlation, a seemingly
unrelated regression (SUR) setup would yield more efficient estimates than pooled estimation. However,
the unbalanced sample requires maximum likelihood (ML) estimation of the SUR model (rather than per
equation estimation combined with feasible generalized least squares as in the case of an balanced sample).
Because of the large amount of coefficients and the substantial number of observations, ML estimation is
practically infeasible. Therefore, we do not consider the SUR model and assume that there is no cross-
sectional correlation among the residuals.
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Table 2 Potential determinants of voting bias
Geography
xeasti j Longitudinal distance between capitals of i and j , if j located to the east of i ;
zero otherwise
xwesti j Longitudinal distance between capitals of i and j , if j located to the west of i ;
zero otherwise
ynorthi j Latitudinal distance between capitals of i and j , if j located to the north of i ; zero
otherwise
ysouthi j Latitudinal distance between capitals of i and j , if j located to the south of i ;
zero otherwise
Neighbi j One if countries i and j are neighbors, zero otherwise
Language
Lang_distti j Distance between language(s) of i and (song of) j in year t
Performance
Malet j One if song of j in year t was sung by male solo singer, zero otherwise
Duett j One if song of j in year t was sung by male–female duet, zero otherwise
Groupt j One if song of j in year t was performed by a group, zero otherwise
Englisht j One if song of j in year t was sung in English, zero otherwise
Frencht j One if song of j in year t was sung in French, zero otherwise
Hostt j One if country j was the host in year t , zero otherwise
Ordert j Order of song of j in year t (1 is first song that was sung)
Cultural dimensions
pdii j Distance between power distance indices of countries i and j
idvi j Distance between individualism indices of i and j
masi j Distance between masculinity indices of i and j
uaii j Distance between uncertainty avoidance indices of i and j
Religion
reli j One if countries i and j share at least one major religion, zero otherwise
Ethnicity
Turkpopi One if country i has a substantial population with Turkish roots, zero otherwise
The estimation results in Table 3 show that the voting biases of 14 out of 36 coun-
tries are significantly affected by their distance to other countries. As motivated in
Sect. 4.2, we distinguish between distance in four directions (north, east, south, and
west). Regarding horizontal distance, the bias in the votes to countries close by is
generally higher than to countries that are located further away (with Luxembourg
and Slovakia as exceptions). Juries do not show a clear preference for songs coming
from, geographically speaking, more western or eastern countries. The number of
juries that significantly dislike songs from countries to their west is virtually the same
as the number of countries that dislikes contributions coming from their east. Moreo-
ver, some juries have a higher voting bias toward all countries close by, independently
of the direction (see Austria, Estonia, Germany, Macedonia, and Turkey). Very dif-
ferent results are established for the effects of the vertical distances between capitals.
Among the juries for which the vertical distance significantly affects the bias, countries
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Table 3 Estimation results for bias models
xeast xwest ynorth ysouth Neighb Lang_dist
Austria −0.15 (−2.41) −0.17 (−2.88)
Belgium




Estonia −0.10 (−4.37) −0.11 (−3.74) 3.79 (3.84)
Finland −0.45 (−2.81)
France
















Portugal 0.06 (2.27) −2.53 (−2.58)
Romania
Russia
Slovakia 0.52 (2.86) −0.14 (−3.38) −0.29 (−3.26) 2.45 (2.52)
Slovenia 2.45 (2.82) −3.89 (−2.85)
Spain −2.81 (−2.92)
Sweden 0.06 (2.33)
Switzerland 0.11 (2.28) 1.51 (2.54) 2.00 (2.54)
Turkey −0.30 (−3.30) −0.07 (−2.36) 0.03 (1.98)
United
Kingdom 0.06 (2.65) 0.12 (3.47) −2.14 (−2.83)
Yugoslavia
Equal slopes −0.024 (−4.02) −0.045 (−7.37) 0.014 (3.82) −1.04 (−7.42)
Table 3 displays the estimation results for the country-specific model in Eq. (5.5), apart from the last row.
This row shows the estimation results for the model in Eq. (5.4) with equal slopes across all countries
(but possibly different intercepts). The tables only report coefficients that are significant at at least a 5%
significance level. The t values in parentheses have been obtained from White (1980)s heteroskedasticity
robust covariance matrix. Coefficients not in bold face are significant at a 5% confidence level; those in
bold face are significant at a 1% level. Country-specific intercepts are not displayed
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generally show higher biases toward countries that are located relatively far way in a
vertical sense (with exception of Bosnia, Finland, and Slovakia). Again, juries show no
particular preference for countries that are, in geographical terms, more to their north
or south. Furthermore, for 6 out of 36 countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, and Switzerland) the voting bias to neighboring countries is significantly
higher than to other countries, while for Macedonia it is significantly lower. For the
remaining 29 countries, there are no significant neighbor effects.
We assess the average impact of the geographical variables on the voting bias by
means of the equal-slopes model. The lower panel of Table 3 (‘equal slopes’) shows
that the average neighbor effect is insignificant. However, distance effects do play a
role in the equal-slopes model. On average, juries favor countries closer by in terms
of horizontal distance, but at the same time, they favor countries further away to the
south. Clearly, these results do not provide sufficient evidence for a ‘battle’ between
Eastern and Western Europe as is often suggested. Nevertheless, on average juries favor
countries located on the same geographical width. This means that western (eastern)
countries are positively biased toward other western (eastern) countries.
6.2 Religion
The estimation results in Table 5 show that religion significantly influences the voting
bias of six countries, even after the correction for cultural and linguistic differences and
similarities between countries. Bosnia favors countries it does not share a main religion
with, while Cyprus, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, and the United Kingdom show opposite
behavior. These countries favor countries with the same religion. The significant role
of religion in the voting behavior of Cyprus and Ireland does not come as a complete
surprise. Ireland is known as a deeply Catholic nation, whereas Cyprus has a strong
Orthodox tradition. The preferences of Bosnia for non-Muslim countries might be
related to the relatively large non-Muslim population in this country (Orthodox and
Roman Catholics) that put their mark on the votes. When we estimate the model
separately for the periods before and after the introduction of televoting in 1997/1998,
we see that the effect of religion is most pronounced in the televoting period. For the
professional juries religion played a less important role than for the televoting public.
Religion also turns out significantly positive in the equal-slopes model; see the lower
panel of Table 5 (‘equal slopes’). This means that, on average, countries are positively
biased toward countries with the same religious background.
6.3 Ethnicity
The sample statistics in Sect. 4.4 suggest that countries with a substantial Turkish
population are strongly biased toward the Turkish contribution to the song contest.
To make this more precise, we include the dummy variable for Turkish migration
in the model of Eq. (5.5), assuming that the impact of this variable on the bias to
the Turkish contribution does not depend on the voting country. Since the dummy
variable does only vary over jury countries and not over time or songs, we have to
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impose this restriction for the purpose of identification.15 The estimation results show
that the countries with a substantial population with Turkish roots have a significantly
higher voting bias toward Turkey. We refer to this phenomenon as patriotic voting.
The estimated coefficient of the Turkish migration dummy has a value of 0.61, with a
corresponding t value of 2.49. To save space we do not report the estimation results
for the other coefficients in the model, but we notice that they are similar to the ones
obtained in the previous model without a role for Turkish nationality. When we estimate
the model separately for the periods before and after the introduction of televoting in
1997/1998, it becomes clear that Turkish migration plays a significant role both before
and after the start of the new voting system. However, the effect in the second period
is stronger than in the first. Hence, the substantial effect of Turkish migration in the
time-invariant model is mainly due to the televoting period.
The Turkish migration dummy is also significant positively in the model with
constant slopes. Its coefficient has a value of 0.95 and corresponding t value 4.55.
This means that, on average, the votes of countries with Turkish immigrants are posi-
tively biased toward Turkey. Again, we do not report the full estimation results for the
model with constant slopes, as they are similar to the ones reported in the lower panel
of Tables 3, 4, 5 (‘equal slopes’).
6.4 Language, culture, and other variables
The estimation results in Tables 3, 4, 5 make clear that there are considerable diffe-
rences across countries. For instance, some juries favor songs coming from a culture
that substantially differs from their own in terms of one or more Hofstede dimensions
(e.g. Portugal with individualism). On average, as expected from cultural preferences,
juries have significantly higher biases toward songs in a related language and to songs
coming from a similar culture. However, some variables that on the aggregate level do
not exert a significant effect on the bias, significantly influence the bias of individual
countries (the duet, group, and male dummy variables, as well as the dummy for songs
sung in English); see the last row of Tables 3, 4, 5. This vindicates again the need for
our approach, in which countries are considered separately when analyzing voting
bias effects.
7 Structural effects in voting bias
The individual (adjusted) R2’s in Table 5 exhibit substantial variation across countries.
For some countries the R2 is high, while for other countries it is close to zero. By com-
paring the R2’s across countries, we can distinguish two groups of countries. The first
group contains the countries for which the voting bias mainly consists of unexplainable
noise. By contrast, the biases in the second group are strongly influenced by the factors
we consider. It is tempting to conclude that the countries with unexplainable biases
15 This also means that we cannot estimate the resulting equations separately for individual countries, but
instead have to rely on joint (least squares) estimation of the panel model for all countries.
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Table 4 Estimation results for bias models (continued)







































Netherlands −0.78 −1.27 −0.67 1.50
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Table 4 continued



















vote objectively, but this would be too bold as we may have omitted some important
explanatory variables in our model.
The adjusted R2 corresponding to the equal-slopes model gives a totally different
impression of the voting bias, as its low value (0.022) suggests that the economic rele-
vance of the voting bias is limited. By contrast, the country-specific analysis shows
that for many individual countries the economic impact of the voting bias is sub-
stantial. At the one hand, this underlines the importance of taking into account the
differences among the various countries for proper assessment of the structure of the
voting bias.16 On the other hand, the low overall R2 points out that the economic
importance of the factors influencing the voting bias is small on the aggregate level,
although their influence is statistically significant. Apparently, the biases of individual
countries caused by certain factors disappear on the aggregate level as they are offset
by opposite preferences of other countries or in different years.17 This suggests that,
on the aggregate level, jury diversity can diminish the impact of particular factors on
the voting bias by making it more likely that the biases of individual jury members
are offset by opposite preferences of other members.
During virtually all Eurovision Song Contests, there have been accusations that
some groups of countries are guilty of regional block voting and also some studies on
16 More formally, a Wald test provides more evidence in favor of the country-specific model. The constant-
slope model is rejected in favor of the country-specific model at a 5% significance level. Additionally, for
all explanatory variables the null hypothesis of similar coefficients across countries is rejected at the same
significance level. Hence, the voting behavior differs substantially across countries.
17 The overall adjusted R2 was lower during the period before the introduction of televoting (0.017) and
much higher thereafter (0.080). But even for the televoting period the adjusted R2 is relatively low.
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Table 5 Estimation results for bias models (continued)
pdi idv mas uai rel R2 adj. R2 # obs
Austria −0.017 0.050 0.017 532
(−2.06)
Belgium 0.023 0.052 0.019 526
(2.16)
Bosnia −0.055 −1.61 0.151 0.069 207
(−2.23) (−2.22)
Croatia 0.235 0.176 254
Cyprus 1.71 0.286 0.258 448
(2.10)
Denmark 0.189 0.155 450
Estonia −0.060 0.031 0.380 0.325 208
(−3.31) (2.28)
Finland 0.040 0.004 482
France 0.061 0.031 579
Germany −0.039 0.015 0.033 0.002 574
(−2.30) (1.98)
Greece 0.233 0.203 479
Hungary 0.146 −0.045 94
Iceland −0.048 −0.017 0.041 1.64 0.163 0.126 352
(−2.14) (−2.03) (2.99) (2.38)
Ireland −0.026 1.21 0.058 0.026 554
(−2.00) (2.29)
Israel 0.029 0.003 491
Italy −0.031 0.098 0.047 335
(−2.16)
Latvia 2.27 0.412 0.267 92
(3.02)
Lithuania 0.330 0.162 91
Luxembourg 0.047 −0.002 366
Macedonia 0.361 0.136 70
Malta 0.087 0.034 315
Monaco 0.107 −0.122 89
Netherlands −0.019 0.074 0.040 512
(−2.11)
Norway −0.033 −0.018 0.029 0.091 0.062 573
(−2.03) (−2.24) (2.45)
Poland −0.046 0.240 0.157 184
(−2.12)
Portugal 0.053 0.092 0.061 550
(3.77)
Romania 0.183 0.034 118
Russia 0.054 −0.058 162
Slovakia 0.516 0.345 70
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Table 5 continued
pdi idv mas uai rel R2 adj. R2 # obs
Slovenia −0.026 0.202 0.125 207
(−2.08)
Spain −0.024 0.078 0.050 596
(−1.96)
Sweden 0.142 0.114 579
Switzerland −0.066 0.099 0.066 506
(−3.55)
Turkey −0.040 0.129 0.100 520
(−3.25)
United Kingdom −0.039 1.11 0.076 0.047 596
(−3.16) (1.97)
Yugoslavia −0.038 0.077 0.104 0.040 253
(−2.06) (2.04)
Equal slopes −0.006 −0.005 0.193 0.026 0.022 13,014
(−3.12) (−3.01) (2.47)
the song contest establish block voting, e.g. Gatherer (2004) and Fenn et al. (2006).
The accusations are particularly directed against the Baltic states, the former Republic
of Yugoslavia, Scandinavian countries, and Greece and Cyprus. Our country-specific
analysis allows us to investigate the accusations in more detail. The influence of
cultural, linguistic, religious and ethnical factors on the votes can be explained by
human behavior. However, when geographical variables turn out significant even after
correction for the former factors, this raises the suspicion that there is ‘political’ voting.
That is, there seems no other way to explain the influence of geographical factors on
the voting bias. Hence, when we verify the usual accusations of political voting and
regional block voting, we look at significant geographical effects after correction for
cultural, linguistic, religious and ethnical variables.
Looking at the Baltic countries, we observe that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania all
tend to give significantly more points to neighboring countries. Additionally, Estonia
also favors countries which are roughly on the same meridian; these include Finland,
Latvia, and Lithuania. For the Nordic countries, the pattern is more subtle. If Finland,
for example, would favor the other Nordic countries, we would expect it to prefer
countries to its west, and to dislike those to its south. Neither of those is true. For
the other Scandinavian countries, none of the geographical features turns out to be
significant, apart from Sweden’s preferences for countries to its north. That seems
to indicate a preference for other Nordic countries, since only Iceland, Finland and
Norway are to its north according to our definitions. However, the influence seems
weak and one would additionally expect the neighbor variable to be significant for
Sweden as well, but it is not. There are strong indications that culture plays an important
role in the voting of both Norway and Iceland, since some of the Hofstede dimensions
are significant for these countries. On the other hand, the relatively high explanatory
power of the model for the voting bias of Denmark and Sweden seems to be caused
mainly by song characteristics. Also language plays an important role in all of these
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countries apart from Iceland, where instead there is an influence based on religious
background.
Regarding the former states of the Republic of Yugoslavia, the only significant
geographical influences that have been established are connected to Slovenia and
Macedonia. For these two countries neighbor and distance effects play a significant
role. Possible block voting between the United Kingdom and Ireland cannot be sub-
stantiated by our research. The United Kingdom favors countries to its north, but also
countries to its south.
Also Cyprus and Greece deserve further mention, as it is probably the most often
cited example of Eurovision Song Contest voting bias. We see that the huge bias
between Cyprus and Greece can be explained for a significant part by the common
language and religious background. The language effect is influential for both coun-
tries, but the religious background is only significant for the voting of Cyprus. Our
analysis shows that linguistic preferences play an important role for many countries,
but the linguistic effect is by far the most significant for Cyprus and Greece.
8 Conclusions
This paper assesses whether and how common characteristics of voting groups affect
the outcomes of voting systems and to what extent these common features result in
voting bias. We take as a case study the Eurovision Song Contest for which an extensive
amount of historical data is available. Rather than analyzing the voting behavior of
the participating countries on the aggregate level (leading to a loss of information),
we zoom in on the voting behavior of individual countries and groups of countries.
In this way, we can also investigate the often heard suspicions and accusations that
politics and international relations dictate a large part of the voting.
There is strong evidence for voting bias in the Eurovision Song Contest, based on
geographical, cultural, linguistic, religious, and ethnical factors. Although on average
countries prefer songs in a related language, coming from a country close by with a
similar culture and religion, there are many countries with different preferences. For
some participants the voting bias mainly consists of unexplainable noise. By contrast,
the votes of other countries are strongly influenced by the various factors. Although
our study uncovers significant geographical patterns in the voting biases (suggesting
political voting), we find hardly any evidence for the publicly debated accusations of
regional block voting by certain countries.
A lesson that we can draw from our analysis of the Eurovision Song Contest is that
when accusations of biased voting are made against a jury or group of peer voters,
it is not enough to analyze the votes of the jury on the aggregate level. The latter
approach ignores the possibility that there are subgroups with their own particular
voting behavior. Consequently, this method may fail to capture all voting patterns
when certain effects offset each other at the aggregate level. We believe that our
results extend to all situations where groups of jury members or peer voters share
certain common factors, due to which a voting bias related to these factors may arise.
It is important to identify such structures explicitly and in a proper way, as it can help
avoiding bias in the first place.
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